Since Brexit, the United Kingdom has tried to redefine its role in international trade. These agreements reflect a broader shift in the UK’s approach to trade since Brexit, where new global opportunities exist alongside continued frictions with Europe. Together, these developments form part of a wider reconfiguration of the UK economy explored across this series. The promise was clear: outside the European Union, the country would be able to design its own trade policy, sign agreements tailored to its interests and open new opportunities for its companies in high-growth markets.
Several years later, the picture is more nuanced. The UK has indeed signed relevant agreements since leaving the EU, but these do not automatically replace the depth of its former relationship with the European market. Trade does not depend only on removing tariffs: distance, regulation, logistics, supply chains and the practical ease of selling in a market also matter.
After leaving the EU, the UK’s first objective was to maintain a basic network of trade agreements. For this reason, much of its initial policy consisted of replicating or adapting agreements that already existed when the UK was an EU Member State. These continuity agreements were important to avoid sudden disruption, but they did not represent a major strategic shift.
The real change came with agreements negotiated directly by the UK. The first major examples were Australia and New Zealand, both in force since 2023. Their value was mainly symbolic and political: they showed that the country could negotiate independently. However, their overall economic impact is limited. They are a developing and attractive markets, but they are geographically distant and much smaller than the EU as trading partners.
More strategically relevant has been the United Kingdom’s accession to the CPTPP, the trans-Pacific agreement that includes economies such as Japan, Canada, Australia, Mexico, Singapore, Vietnam, Chile, Peru, Malaysia, Brunei and New Zealand. The UK’s entry, effective from December 2024, allows the country to strengthen ties with Asia-Pacific and position itself in areas such as digital services, investment, advanced manufacturing and diversified supply chains.
Even so, its immediate scope should not be overstated. The CPTPP opens doors, but it does not turn the Pacific into a natural substitute for Europe. For many companies, especially SMEs, selling to France, Germany, Ireland or the Netherlands will remain easier than operating in much more distant markets. The opportunity exists, but it requires resources, local knowledge and a more sophisticated international strategy.
The agreement with India, signed in July 2025, is probably one of the most relevant in terms of long-term potential. India combines size, demographic growth, digitalisation and an expanding middle class. For the UK, the agreement may open opportunities in beverages, automotive, services, technology, education and consumer goods. But India is also a complex market, with regulatory, cultural and operational differences that require preparation.
The agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council, concluded on 20 May 2026, adds another important piece. It includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain, and makes the UK the first G7 country to conclude a free trade agreement with this bloc. Its relevance goes beyond tariffs: it strengthens the British position in sectors such as technology, life sciences, food, aerospace, professional services and the energy transition.
So, have post-Brexit agreements worked? It depends on how success is measured. If the objective was to demonstrate trade autonomy, the UK has made progress. If the objective was to fully compensate for the frictions created with the EU, the outcome is less clear.
The new agreements can open markets and improve access conditions, but they do not remove the additional costs that many companies still face in their trade with Europe. A trade agreement creates the framework; real sales depend on companies understanding it, using it and adapting their strategy.
The question is no longer whether the United Kingdom can sign trade agreements. It has already shown that it can. The question now is different: which companies will be able to turn those agreements into real opportunities?